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Abstract 
In this contribution, the author engages in a conversation with Christopher Southgate on the 
relationship between social evil and what is called natural “evil.” Theologically, this centers 
around an understanding of creation and fall. It is argued that Southgate typically treats 
soteriology and eschatology as themes pertaining to an evolutionary theodicy, whereas an 
adequate ecotheology would discuss the problem of natural suffering under the rubric of the 
narrative of God’s economy. The question is then how that story is best told. 
To start a conversation 
In November 2008 (or thereabouts), Christopher Southgate came to New York City for a 
poetry event. He was invited by Wentzel van Huyssteen to visit his postgraduate seminar at 
Princeton Theological Seminary to discuss with the students The Groaning of Creation that 
had been published earlier that year. I was a fellow at the Center for Theological Inquiry at 
the time and also attended that seminar. In the discussion, I made a little list of various 
root causes of (human) suffering (see below) and asked Southgate which of these should be 
regarded as primary. If suffering manifests itself as symptom at the surface level, how can 
the underlying problem be diagnosed? What, then, should be the main target to be 
addressed by the Christian message of salvation in Jesus Christ through the work of the Holy 
Spirit? Here is the list (as I polished it up later —see Conradie 2013b, 19–20): 
1. The recognition of the role played by randomness and contingency in a world that is less
perfectly Platonic than some may have wished? 
2. Entropy and the arrow of time implying the transience of everything in the universe
(including stars, planets, continents, mountains, rivers, species, and living organisms)? The 
destructive forces of gravity? 
3. The pre-programmed limited life cycle of multicellular organisms and their cells
(planned obsolescence)? 
4. The very basis of biological functioning in terms of living organisms absorbing inorganic
materials (for humans: eating organic leftovers such as seeds, fruits, and nuts)? 
5. Eating living organic material (plants)? Eating other living organisms (meat)? (see
Conradie 2016) 
6. Illness, faltering health, aging, degeneration, and the decay of possibilities?
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7. The eventual mortality of every form of life but also of species? 
8. The contingency, dead ends, chaotic and experimental nature, and incredible 
wastefulness of evolutionary drivers? 
9. Pain impulses (which is an evolutionary advantage)? The suffering endured by sentient 
animals? 
10. Anxieties over the possibility of future suffering among the “higher” mammals? 
11. Killing for food? Parasites living from other living organisms? Excessive violence, 
brutality, and “torture” between nonhuman species? 
12. The destructive presence of humans in ecosystems (only)? Is nature only to be 
redeemed from anthropogenic destruction? How does the emergence of human sin relate to 
the other factors mentioned above? Is it the almost inevitable result of an anxiety over 
human finitude? 
 
As I remember it, Southgate responded by agreeing with me that anthropogenic suffering (the 
last on the list) is indeed the main problem that has to be addressed, although he added that 
the relationship between animal brutality and human sin would need to be further explored. 
His answer made good sense given his contributions to Christian ecotheology where the focus 
is clearly on anthropogenic ecological destruction. However, the preface of The Groaning of 
Creation includes a parable on animal brutality (the second last on the list) with reference to 
orcas hunting near Vancouver Island. But how are these two levels of the root causes of suffering 
related to each other? In a word: what is the relation between what is usually termed natural 
“evil” and social evil? Is social evil (wrongdoing in one species) perhaps merely one 
manifestation of natural evil? 
 
This is of course a loaded question, one that illustrates deep divides in contemporary 
Christian theology. In liberation theology, black theology, feminist theology, Mujerista 
theology, Minjung theology, Dalit theology, ecotheology, animal theology and a range of 
indigenous theologies the focus is clearly on social evil (economic inequality, white supremacy, 
oppression, patriarchy, colonization, hierarchies of class and caste, anthropogenic climate 
change, cruelty to animals, and so on). The focus on the intellectual problem of natural evil 
found elsewhere (especially in the North Atlantic context), is treated with some suspicion as 
the esoteric interest of those who can afford to worry about that. 
 
Put differently: while some focus on problems pertaining to God’s “very good” creation, others 
focus on the palpable need for salvation (or liberation). How, then, is God’s work of creation 
related to God’s work of salvation and consummation? Although some discuss social evil in 
the context of the theodicy problem as a logical or philosophical problem, others treat it 
as a soteriological problem—or often merely as an ethical, a pastoral or a practical problem 
(how to cope with suffering derived from evil; see Southgate and Robinson 2007, 78). Even 
where the focus is on the theodicy problem (“the task of affirming the righteousness of God 
in the face of the existence of evil”; Southgate and Robinson 2007, 67), the focus can be on 
social evil (injustices and oppression calling for liberation) or on natural evil (suffering 





Christopher Southgate’s oeuvre is remarkable since he is clearly deeply concerned about both 
natural evil and social evil. These two concerns meet in the context of his contributions to 
ecotheology, a field in which we have worked closely together within the Christian Faith and 
the Earth project (see Conradie 2012; Conradie et al. 2014) and the Exeter project on 
ecological hermeneutics (see Horrell et al. 2010). These concerns are expressed more 
profoundly in his collections of poetry (which I will not explore here). 
 
In this contribution I will focus on the way Southgate understands the relationship 
between natural evil and social evil in a selection of his recent texts. I will pay him the 
respect due to a friend and long-standing conversation partner, namely to listen carefully, to 
ask critical questions, and to continue the conversation because the compelling subject 
matter (the underlying questions) has precedence over any individual opinions. 
 
To sin or not to sin: is that the question? 
What is the relationship between social evil and natural “evil” (the latter in my view a misnomer 
because no human agency is involved)? This question needs some “precisioning.” Let me offer 
three possible ways of framing the question from within Christian theology in order to explore 
the second and third in more detail below. 
 
One may approach this question from the perspective of specific cases of suffering. One may 
identify at least five such sources of suffering (see Conradie 2005). The first of these is suffering 
resulting from a range of natural causes (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, predation, 
degeneration, dying, death), sometimes referred to as natural “evil.” Such suffering would be 
there irrespective of the presence of humans in ecosystems although the suffering may be greatly 
exacerbated by human folly or evil intent (e.g., the actual impact of tsunamis; Southgate 2014a, 
799). Then there is suffering resulting from pure contingency: being in the wrong place at the 
right time (e.g., road “accidents,” forest fires resulting from lightning). The other three result from 
social evil: suffering as a result of one’s own sins (guilt, remorse, self-injury, bad habits, being justly 
punished), being sinned against (gossip, insults, assault, rape, murder), and structural violence 
(ideologies such as imperialism, racism, sexism that become embedded in social structures). 
 
To these five main sources of suffering one may add heroic self-sacrifice, vicarious representation, 
and divine (dis)election. It is pastorally both necessary and dangerous to distinguish between 
such sources of suffering. In cases of the death of a child from cancer, an accident, or suicide, a 
distinction is clearly necessary. In contrast, to discern the causes of death in the case of 
HIV/AIDS may simply add to the stigma, especially in cases where a woman who has been faithful 
to her partner contracts the disease because the partner has been unfaithful. 
 
Another way of framing the question is whether human sin is the necessary or more or less 
inevitable result of anxiety over natural suffering, or if suffering is the result of sin. Both 
positions are clearly untenable. To suggest that biological death is the result of sin makes little 
sense in terms of what we know of evolutionary history, as Southgate argues. To treat social 
evil merely as a symptom of underlying natural causes is to thwart the need for moral pedagogy, 




perpetrators are treated merely as victims cannot suffice as there is a need in human 
communities for adults to take moral responsibility for their own actions. To recognize that 
both extremes are untenable implies the need for theological reflection on the origins of evil—
albeit that talking about evil may well exacerbate evil, while any attempt to explain the origin of 
evil, to comprehend sin, to find a place for sin within a meaningful whole, is spiritually a 
temptation to justify ourselves. In the discussion below I will return to the diverging answers 
regarding the roots of what is usually called natural “evil” and social evil. 
 
A third way of approaching the question is to commence with the Christian message of 
salvation. The question is then whether this message is primarily aimed at overcoming 
suffering from natural causes or human-induced suffering or both. In ecotheology, there is little 
doubt that the message of salvation extends to the whole of creation, including other animals, 
but the underlying problem remains anthropogenic ecological destruction. But how is such 
salvation related to God’s beloved creation if such suffering is necessarily embedded in an 
evolving creation? This question is addressed in Christian soteriology and especially eschatology. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Conradie 2015, 272–87), there are diverging theological positions 
here that can be classified in terms of key words such as restoration (the classic Reformed 
position), elevation (the classic Catholic and Eastern Orthodox position), replacement (the 
Anabaptist option), or endless recycling (a liberal/process position). Each of these approaches 
is seriously flawed, but as far as I can see there are no alternatives available (yet). I think 
Christopher Southgate would emphasize elevation (recognizing the need to address natural 
suffering), even hoping for a “pelican heaven” (2008b, 82–91), while I have defended the need 
for restoration (prioritizing the need to address social evil) despite its evident inadequacy in 
recognizing evolutionary history (Conradie 2013b, 2015). In short, theologians tell the story 
of God’s work from creation to eschatological consummation in rather different ways. 
 
What went wrong? 
Southgate opens the discussion in The Groaning of Creation with the tension between the (from 
an evolutionary perspective) counterintuitive Christian affirmation of the goodness of creation 
(see Conradie 2013a) and the recognition that nature is “clumsy, wasteful, blundering, low and 
horridly cruel” (Southgate 2008b, 2). His argument is that creation is both good and 
groaning (with reference to Romans 8:22). If so, why is creation groaning in “travail”—due 
to natural evil or to social evil or both? How is the Greek term ϕθ ορᾶς in Romans 8:21 to be 
interpreted? (see Southgate 2008b, 92–97). In ecotheology, such “groaning” is usually 
associated with anthropogenic destruction, but the primary problem addressed in The 
Groaning of Creation is the harder one of natural pain (for sentient forms of life), suffering 
(arguably for animals with consciousness), and anxiety (for animals with self-consciousness). 
This, Southgate argues, is a problem recognized in Darwin’s time but often underplayed in the 
twentieth century due to the massive human suffering induced by other humans. He is acutely 
aware that such natural suffering forms a necessary part of life and of evolution and that this 
challenges the belief in a benevolent Creator. The main problem is not so much pain (a 
necessary concomitant of sentient life) or death (a thermodynamic necessity), or the loss of 
non-living entities (through change), but that many (most) living creatures seem to be the 




suffering and no richness or joy (2008b, 40). (Note that this answer is not quite the same 
as the one given above in response to my question to him.) The focus of The Groaning of 
Creation is indeed on natural suffering and this work should be understood as a contribution to 
an evolutionary theodicy, albeit that the chapter on “The Call to Humanity” (2008b, 92–115) 
also recognizes anthropogenic ecological destruction. 
 
To his credit, Southgate resists anthropocentric solutions to this problem that regard animal 
suffering as the price being exacted from other animals for the sake of the emergence of human 
consciousness and freedom (2008b, 43). This would sacrifice the victims of evolutionary 
history for the sake of some future (human) telos. Yet, he opts for a teleological scheme as 
well, albeit a more inclusive one, namely that the life forms found in the biosphere 
required an evolutionary process extending backwards into deep time. This “strongly 
teleological” scheme opts for “the value of every creature both as a good in itself and as a vital 
component of an ecosystem” (2008b, 71), but also prizes the propensities towards increasing 
complexity and levels of consciousness. His main argument, following what he calls a good–
harm analysis, is an “only way argument” (or better: the “best” possible way) that he 
captures (and italicizes) as follows: 
 
I hold that the sort of universe we have, in which complexity emerges in a process 
governed by thermodynamic necessity and Darwinian natural selection, and therefore by 
death, pain, predation, and self-assertion, is the only sort of universe that could give rise to 
the range, beauty, complexity, and diversity of creatures the Earth has produced. (Southgate 
2008b, 29) 
 
In many of his recent writings, Southgate reiterates the point that value and disvalue are 
integral parts of the same evolutionary process: “it is the same process—evolution driven at 
least in part by natural selection— that gives rise to both the values of beauty, diversity, 
and ingenuity in creation, and to the disvalues of suffering and extinction. Further, it is the 
same processes that cause so much ‘natural evil’ experienced by humans— earthquakes, 
tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, and typhoons— that made the world so 
extravagantly fruitful for life” (2014a, 785). This is a seminal insight that guides his thinking 
on evolution and where things have gone wrong. 
 
In an important section of a chapter on “Roads Not Taken,” Southgate opts to do without a fall 
from paradise (2008b, 28–35). He fully acknowledges the role and impact of human sin in 
the form of blame, envy, and violence (2008b, 28). He also acknowledges that humans are 
fallen creatures who will never find their place on this planet unless they find their home 
with and in the love of God (2008b, 100). This failure has obvious environmental 
consequences for a “groaning” creation. However, he rejects the Augustinian idea that the 
world was created free from struggle, predation, parasitism, and violence and that it was 
subsequently corrupted by human rebellion. There was no paradise on Earth and hence no 
fall from paradise, neither a cosmic fall, nor a human fall. He refuses to blame aspects of the 




tsunamis, predation) on the results of a human, angelic, or cosmic fall. The Creator has to 
accept responsibility for such aspects. 
 
Southgate’s intentions are clear, namely to confront the challenge posed by evolutionary 
biology as honestly and bravely as possible while maintaining the belief in God as Creator 
and Savior. To do so, he cannot let God off the hook by putting the blame elsewhere. He also 
cannot allow an ontological dualism, separating some distorted elements in creation from 
other good ones whenever the going gets rough (2008b, 32). Southgate regards it as “a 
common Christian mistake to dissect out what we love about life and attribute it to God, 
and then to take the uglier bits and attribute them to Satan” (2015, 246–47). Instead, he 
acknowledges what is unpalatable to many: It was presumably God who created the suffering 
in evolution (2015, 246). In short, evil is not a privation of the good, but a necessary 
concomitant of the creation of the good: “the same processes that lead to the refinement of 
creaturely characteristics also lead to suffering and extinction” (2015, 247). 
 
This is an important move for understanding the relationship between natural suffering and 
social evil. If natural suffering is not the result of human sin (which is clearly the case, 
although such suffering may be exacerbated by sin), is human sin then the result of 
anxieties born from struggle, parasitism, and predation? Southgate seems to agree that “our 
evolutionary inheritance makes it utterly unsurprising that we are creatures prone to violent 
and greedy self-assertion, yet it is what has made us the animals we are with all the 
possibilities for goodness that entails” (2008b, 35). In this way, he can affirm a state of 
fallenness while doing away with an historical fall, which he argues is simply impossible to 
sustain (2008a, 251). If humans are fallen without having fallen, how is the story of creation, 
fall, and redemption then to be told? The added problem, Southgate (2011, 383) observes in a 
discussion on a Barthian shadow-side to God’s otherwise good creation, is that suffering does 
seem to come before sin in evolutionary history: “But this is the crucial point. Evolutionary 
history does not begin with the story of sin and the Fall of human beings. It begins with 
millions of years in which the light and shadow of creation are to be found together, but from 
which the freely chosen sin that Barth calls a disastrous defeat is absent.” How, then, does sin 
emerge in the first place? I think Southgate thinks that sin is indeed inevitable since it is an 
extrapolation of the way in which disvalue is intrinsically and necessarily intertwined with 
the values that the Creator envisaged (2011, 378). He tends to agree with Celia Deane-
Drummond (2009, 187) that human fallenness is a “culmination of tendencies already 
latent in the natural world.” Salvation in Jesus Christ therefore has to address not only human 
fallenness but also the underlying problem that gave rise to such fallenness. 
 
How does Southgate tell the story? 
Southgate and his friend Andrew Robinson offer a typology of three versions of the story of 
God’s work given their well-known typology of various theodicies based on what they term a 
“good–harm analysis.” They identify three logical relations between goods and harms. In the 
property– consequence model, humans possessed the property of freedom, squandered that 
by falling into total depravity, and therefore need the gift of grace to be rescued from this 




is, as part of a necessary learning curve that humans experience in developing towards full 
maturity and a sense of responsibility (a “soul-making” theodicy). They may be inspired in 
this process by Christ’s example of God-consciousness and kenotic self-giving. In the 
constitutive model, human fallenness is regarded as a mystery that is nevertheless the 
inevitable inverse of the emergence of the good. It suggests that “harm comes to people both 
by the evil actions of others and by the will of the Lord, and for the furtherance of his glory” 
(Southgate and Robinson 2007, 81). The theme of God’s glory is one that Southgate has 
been exploring more recently (see 2014a), but already in a 2002 article he had adopted a 
developmental theodicy in which he admits that evolution gives rise to goods and that harms 
may (will) occur in the same process. He augments this not only with divine fellow-suffering 
(kenosis) and eschatological compensation, but also a role for humans as co-redeemers in the 
healing of creation (Southgate and Robinson 2007, 88, almost verbatim). For Southgate, 
God takes creaturely pain into the heart of the Godhead both in creation and in redemption, 
albeit that he resists seeing creation as cruciform. (2014a, 805) 
 
In an article on God’s glory, Southgate comments in more detail on this three-part story, 
that he admits “still contains profound elements of tragedy” (2014a, 803): 
 
Gloria mundi, gloria crucis, gloria in excelsis. Too often Christian exposition has concentrated 
only on the second of these stories, paving the way for the third. I suggest that Christianity 
has sold itself short through inadequate attention to the first story, to protological glory, 
difficult and troubling concept though we have found this to be. In considering the natural 
world, the Christian contemplative must look at the whole of the three-act story. That story 
brings to every entity and event in the drama of creation the perspective that God became 
incarnate and suffered for the transformation of the world, and that there will be a 
transformed state of that world in which those creatures that appear victims in the first story 
know flourishing in the third. (2014a, 800) 
 
In an as yet unpublished essay entitled “‘Free-Process’ and ‘Only Way’ Arguments” (Southgate 
forthcoming) Southgate offers a fuller account of his version of the narrative in response to the 
question of why God should have to redeem, or heal, what God has created: 
 
To be wholly consistent, the narrative must run like this: only a Darwinian process full of 
ambiguity could give rise to a world in which myriad types of creature could flourish, and in 
which the Logos could be incarnate and atone for the (inevitable) sins of an evolutionary 
world. That atonement— however understood—makes possible the eschatological phase of 
God’s work, the “new creation” (Isaiah 65:17; 2 Corinthians 5:17). That phase leads 
ultimately to a dimension of existence in which there is no more suffering. But we are 
forced to conclude, if thinking this way, both that the initial ambiguous phase was a 






In what follows below I will rearrange the categories, drawing on my own overview of four 
ways of telling the Christian story from creation to eschatological consummation (see again 
Conradie 2015, 272–87). 
 
Given Southgate’s option not to follow the route of a fall from paradise, he rejects the version 
of the Christian story as a U-shaped curve, namely moving from paradise to paradise lost and 
paradise regained (2008b, 34). This (Augustinian and classically reformed) narrative logic of 
creation–fall– redemption–consummation suggests that the primary problem is human sin 
since the goodness of creation (what is material, earthly, and bodily) can be affirmed. This 
typically assumes that suffering and death is the result of sin. Accordingly, God’s providence is 
understood as God’s way of restricting the devastating impact of sin through “common grace” 
(Kuyper) in order to create the necessary room for the history of salvation. The message of 
salvation in Jesus Christ and through the Holy Spirit then responds to human sin, namely 
the alienation between God and humanity that resulted from the Fall. This message of 
salvation brings reconciliation, healing, and well-being already in this dispensation, but 
the impact of sin cannot be overcome yet as attempts to eradicate evil completely will yield 
more evil. The eschatological consummation of all things then has to address the lasting 
impact of evil through a final victory over the power of evil, including death, through the 
resurrection of the body and eternal life. In this way eschatological consummation is 
understood primarily as restoring the integrity of God’s original creation, that is as rereation 
and not as a new creation that would replace the former dispensation (see Conradie 
2013a, b). The eschaton affirms the goodness of the proton. 
 
This version of the story is typically rejected by theologians seeking to take evolutionary 
history seriously since it cannot recognize the presence of suffering, death, and extinction long 
before humans emerge. For Southgate, this is the problem that an evolutionary theodicy has to 
address. As far as I can see there are three main alternatives to this narrative logic. 
 
The latest alternative is to admit that this world and this life is all that we have, that there is 
no solace for the individual victims of history and that our last best hope is for recycling, 
that is that life will go on as far as the laws of thermodynamics allow. From this 
perspective, predation, premature death, and extinction are perhaps tragic but serve the 
greater good of Life itself. God becomes the Recycler of all things, understood in either an 
(androcentric?) deist or a (feminist?) pantheist, but often in a rather secular, way with 
reference to Mother Nature. This narrative does allow for a critique of unnecessary suffering 
through domination in the name of differences of gender, race, class, and species, leading to 
injustices and oppression, but such suffering can never be undone. Southgate clearly does not 
follow this route either since he is concerned over the suffering of individuated creatures that 
die without an opportunity to flourish. He asks: What difference does God’s care make in the 
experience of the individual non human creature? (Southgate 2014b, 111). 
 
An earlier (classically Anabaptist, perhaps Manichaean) alternative is to hope for an 
eschatological replacement of the old creation. The old worn out “shoes” will be thrown away 




recreation). The attraction of this narrative logic is that suffering, predation, premature 
death, and extinction can then be fully recognized as problematic. The hope that these can 
be finally overcome is kept alive, albeit that such a new creation remains speculative, despite 
some hints that “a different world is possible.” For Jews and Christians, the Exodus and the 
resurrection of Christ offer paradigmatic pointers to such a hope. This narrative logic comes 
at the cost of undermining an affirmation of the goodness of creation. In Platonic schemes, 
materiality and embodiment become a kind of necessary evil, rather than something 
primordially affirmed as “good” (Southgate 2014a, 787). Creation is thus inherently flawed 
and has to be replaced. It begs questions about the continuity between creation and new 
creation. In the end it is difficult to avoid the impression that the Spirit has to rectify the 
botched job of the Father. Although he also hopes for an eschatological resolution of the 
suffering rooted in evolutionary history, Southgate is hardly attracted to this route. He 
recognizes that this separates the God of creation from the God of redemption and defeats the 
task of any theodicy (Southgate and Robinson 2007, 83). 
 
The third alternative is the classically Eastern Orthodox and Catholic narrative logic, namely 
to maintain that grace does not cancel but perfects nature. The narrative logic is one of 
elevation (or development?) and can draw on Irenaean, Athanasian, or Thomist categories 
such as theosis, transfiguration, maturation, and perfection. The Fall is then understood as a 
human failure to mature to our full potential (Southgate 2008b, 110), whereas salvation 
follows a development path towards humans becoming co-creators, even co-redeemers with 
God (Southgate 2014b, 114). In this way it is quite possible to affirm the inadequacies of God’s 
otherwise good creation (for Southgate symbolized by the second Pelican chick’s fate) and to 
recognize the impact of human sin in the hope that redemption and eschatological 
consummation will address not only the problem of sin but will also recognize and elevate each 
creature’s life before God. Southgate is clearly attracted to this narrative logic more than the 
others. 
 
The danger, though, is that creation and fall will become conflated and treated as co-original, 
or as alternating features of the human condition. For Southgate, the Fall reflects a general 
condition rather than a historical (or logical?) chronology (2008b, 102). If so, redemption 
and consummation then have to overcome not only the (ecological) impact of human sin, but 
also the inadequacies of God’s otherwise “quite good” creation. Since the message of salvation 
cannot alleviate natural suffering and death already within evolutionary history, such 
suffering and premature death can only be overcome eschatologically, that is, beyond history. 
The eschatological consummation then has to replace, transform, or transfigure protological 
creaturely existence. 
 
Southgate and others may argue that natural selection, and the suffering embedded in it, is 
the “only way” for the evolution of life. However, if “another” way is eschatologically 
possible, why did God as Creator not make use of this way from the beginning? Are God as 
Creator and God as Redeemer in tension with each other here? This is a question Southgate 
also raises. Why did God not just create heaven? (2008b, 90). In response, he returns to his 




you like, how the building blocks used for eschatological consummation could be gathered 
together. Still, the question remains of how the continuity in God’s work is recognized and 
whether it is not too speculative to assume that protological problems will be overcome 
eschatologically. 
 
The need for a temporal sequence? 
Traditional theologies of restoration assume a temporal sequence from creation to fall to 
salvation and consummation (sometimes grouped together as redemption). This “step-wise” 
logic avoids a conflation of creation and fall and thus affirms the goodness of creation so that 
human sin can be regarded as the primary problem to be addressed by the message of salvation. 
However, this version of the story can hardly do justice to the problem of natural suffering 
that an evolutionary theodicy (like Southgate’s) seeks to address. 
 
How crucial is such a temporal sequence? If we have to “drop the Fall” (i.e., a historical 
fall; see Van den Brink 2011), can this sequence be dropped as well? Most attempts to develop 
an evolutionary theology within the context of ecotheology (as wide apart as those proposed by 
Hendrikus Berkhof, Denis Edwards, John Haught, Philip Hefner, or Teilhard de Chardin) 
seem to follow that route by integrating the emergence of the human species with the 
emergence of social evil. Often (not by Berkhof or Edwards though) being created and being 
fallen are treated as ahistorical, mythical features of human existence, and thus as co-
original. However, such ahistoricity can hardly do justice to evolutionary change or to the 
particularity of the Christian story as one situated in (human) history. The Christian faith 
makes no sense other than as telling the story of divine action in history (another topic 
on which Southgate and I have had numerous conversations). Theology and evolutionary 
biology cannot be regarded as nonoverlapping magisteria since they seek to interpret the 
same history. One therefore cannot escape from the need to tell the story, that is to seek a 
narrative reinterpretation of evolutionary history (see Conradie 2008). 
 
The danger for any evolutionary theology is merging creation and fall so that fallenness is 
regarded pretty much as the necessary result of natural “evil.” At best, there is then a complex 
interplay between the tragic and the emergence of human responsibility. If so, the Christian 
message of salvation and especially consummation has to respond to the deeper, underlying 
problem of natural suffering. Some (like Southgate) would hope for a “new creation” where the 
suffering of each individual sentient creature will be addressed, whereas others have no such 
hope for the victims of evolutionary history and therefore focus on alleviating suffering here 
and now. 
 
I, for one, prefer a sharper distinction between creation and fall in order to emphasize (in the 
context of ecotheology) that our primary problem is indeed anthropogenic. I also suggest 
that a historical fall need not be contested in the sense of the inception and spread of social 
evil. What is contested is whether this is a fall from either “paradise” or from innocence. The 
deeper question is whether social evil is an inevitable by-product of hominid evolution so 
that this may also be regarded as a “disvalue” that is inseparable from the “value” of the 




suffering but also for human sin. Given the soteriological core of the Christian faith, such a 
monist answer has to be rejected as much as its alternative, namely an ontological dualism 
that would undermine God’s sovereignty. There may well be contextual differences as to 
where one would see current dangers amongst one’s interlocutors in this regard. Southgate 
is clearly willing to face up to the dangers embedded in monism through his understanding 
of God’s glory which, he argues, is both awe-inspiring and ominous (see 2014a, 799). 
 
In distinguishing creation and fall I seek to “redeem” the category of sin (Conradie 2017). 
However, this of course does not yet address the problem of natural suffering. We remain 
deeply indebted to Christopher Southgate for helping us to take this problem seriously and 
to do so in such a way that God’s compassion for each individual creature becomes evident. 
Put cryptically, I suggest that an adequate ecotheology should treat the theodicy problem 
under the rubric of soteriology (or better: the narrative of God’s householding, i.e., the 
οικονομ ία τ ου eεού  ) instead of discussing soteriology under the rubric of an evolutionary 
theodicy. I am suspicious of the latter strategy whereas Southgate, I presume, would be 
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